Word puzzles and the problem of their representations in logic languages have received considerable attention in the last decade (Ponnuru et al. 2004; Shapiro 2011; Baral and Dzifcak 2012; Schwitter 2013). Of special interest is the problem of generating such representations directly from natural language (NL) or controlled natural language (CNL). An interesting variation of this problem, and to the best of our knowledge, scarcely explored variation in this context, is when the input information is inconsistent. In such situations, the existing encodings of word puzzles produce inconsistent representations and break down. In this paper, we bring the well-known type of paraconsistent logics, called Annotated Predicate Calculus (APC) (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992), to bear on the problem. We introduce a new kind of non-monotonic semantics for APC, called consistency preferred stable models and argue that it makes APC into a suitable platform for dealing with inconsistency in word puzzles and, more generally, in NL sentences. We also devise a number of general principles to help the user choose among the different representations of NL sentences, which might seem equivalent but, in fact, behave differently when inconsistent information is taken into account. These principles can be incorporated into existing CNL translators, such as Attempto Controlled English (ACE) (Fuchs et al. 2008) and PENG Light (White and Schwitter 2009). Finally, we show that APC with the consistency preferred stable model semantics can be equivalently embedded in ASP with preferences over stable models, and we use this embedding to implement this version of APC in Clingo (Gebser et al. 2011 ) and its Asprin add-on (Brewka et al. 2015) .
Introduction
The problem of logical representation for word puzzles has recently received considerable attention (Ponnuru et al. 2004; Shapiro 2011; Baral and Dzifcak 2012; Schwitter 2013) . In all of these studies, however, the input information is assumed to be consistent and the proposed logical representations break on inconsistent input. The present paper proposes an approach that works in the presence of inconsistency and not just for word puzzles.
At first sight, one might think that the mere use of a paraconsistent logic such as Belanp's four valued logic (Belnap Jr 1977) or Annotated Logic Programming (Blair and Subrahmanian 1989; Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992 ) is all what is needed to address the problem, but it is not so. We do start with a well-known paraconsistent logic, called Annotated Predicate Calculus (APC) (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992) , which is related to the aforementioned Annotated Logic Programs, but this is not enough: a number of issues arise in the presence of paraconsistency and different translations might seem equivalent but behave differently when inconsistent information is taken into account. As it turns out, several factors can affect the choice of the "right" logical representation for many NL sentences, especially for implications. We formalize several principles to guide the translation of NL sentences into APC, principles that can be incorporated into existing controlled language translators, such as Attempto Controlled English (ACE) (Fuchs et al. 2008) and PENG Light (White and Schwitter 2009). We illustrate these issues with the classical Jobs Puzzle (Wos et al. 1984) and show how inconsistent information affects the conclusions.
To address the above problems formally, we introduce a new kind of non-monotonic semantics for APC, which is based on consistency-preferred stable models and is inspired by the concept of the most epistemically-consistent models of (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992) . We argue that this new semantics makes APC into a good platform for dealing with inconsistency in word puzzles and, more generally, for translating natural language sentences into logic.
Finally, we show that the consistency-preferred stable models of APC can be computed using answer-set programming (ASP) systems that support preferences over stable models, such as Clingo (Gebser et al. 2011 ) with the Asprin add-on (Brewka et al. 2015) .
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background material on APC. In Section 3 we consider the logic programming subset of APC and define preferential stable models for it. In Section 4, we show that the logic programming subset of APC (under the consistencypreferred stable model semantics) can be encoded in ASP in semantically-preserving way. In Section 5, we discuss variations of Jobs Puzzle (Wos et al. 1984) when various kinds of inconsistency are injected into the formulation of the puzzle. Section 6 explains that logical encoding of common knowledge in the presence of inconsistency needs to take into account a number of considerations that are not present when inconsistency is not an issue. We organize those considerations into several different principles and illustrate their impact. Section 8 concludes the paper. Finally, Appendix A contains the full encoding of Jobs Puzzle in APC under the consistency-preferred semantics. This appendix also includes variations that inject various kinds of inconsistency into the puzzle, and the derived conclusions are discussed. Appendices B and C contain similar analyses of other well-known puzzles: Zebra Puzzle 1 and Marathon Puzzle (C. Guéret and Sevaux 2000) . Ready-to-run encodings of these programs in Clingo/Asprin can be found at https://bitbucket.org/tiantiangao/apc_lp.
Annotated Predicate Calculus: Background and Extensions
To make this paper self-contained, this section provides the necessary background on APC. At the end of the section, we define new semantic concepts for APC, which will be employed in later sections.
The alphabet of APC consists of countably-infinite sets of: variables V , function symbols F (each symbol having an arity; constants are viewed as 0-ary function symbols), predicate symbols P, truth annotations, quantifiers, and logical connectives. In (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992) , truth annotations could come from an arbitrary upper semilattice (called "belief semilattice" there), but here we will use only ⊥ (unknown), f (false), t (true) and ⊤ (contradiction or inconsistency), which are partially ordered as follows: ⊥≤ f ≤ ⊤ and ⊥≤ t ≤ ⊤. Terms in APC are constructed exactly as in predicate calculus: from constants, variables and function symbols. A ground term is one that has no variables.
Definition 1 (Atomic formulas (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992)).
A predicate term has the form p(t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ), where p is a n-ary predicate symbol and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n are terms. An APC atomic formula (or an APC predicate) has the form p(t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ) : s, where p(t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ) is a predicate term and s is annotation indicating the degree of belief (or truth) in the predicate term. A ground atomic formula is an atomic formula that has no variables.
We call an atomic formula of the form p : s a t-predicate (resp., an f-, ⊤-, or ⊥-predicate) if s is t (resp., f-, ⊤-, or ⊥).
APC includes the usual universal and existential quantifiers, the connectives, ∧ and ∨, and there are two negation and two implication connectives: the ontological negation ¬ and ontological implication ←, plus the epistemic negation ∼ and epistemic implication <∼. As will be seen later, the distinction between the ontological and the epistemic connectives is useful because they behave differently in the presence of inconsistency.
Definition 2 (APC well-formed formulas (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992)
). An APC well-formed formula is defined inductively as follows:
-an atomic formula p(t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ) : s -if φ and ψ are well-formed formulas, then so are ∼ φ , ¬φ , φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, φ ← ψ, and φ <∼ ψ.
-if φ is a formula and X is a variable, then (∀Xφ ) and (∃Xφ ) are formulas.
An APC literal is either a predicate p : s or an ontologically negated predicate ¬p : s. An epistemic literal is either a predicate p : s or an epistemically negated predicate ∼ p : s.
In (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992) , the semantics was defined with respect to general models, but here we will be dealing with logic programs and the Herbrand semantics will be more handy.
Definition 3 (APC Herbrand universe, base, and interpretations). The Herbrand universe U for APC is the set of all ground terms. The Herbrand base B for APC is the set of all ground APC atomic formulas. An Herbrand interpretation I for APC is a non-empty subset of the Herbrand base that is closed with respect to the following operations: -if p : s ∈ I, then also p : s ′ ∈ I for all s ′ ≤ s; and -if p : s 1 , p : s 2 ∈ I, and s = lub ≤ (s 1 , s 2 ) then p : s ∈ I.
The annotations used in APC form a lattice (in our case a 4-element lattice) with the order ≤ and with lub ≤ used as the least upper bound operator of that lattice. We will also use B ⊤ to denote the subset of all ⊤-predicates in B.
As usual, a variable assignment is a mapping ν : V → U that takes a variable and returns a ground term. This mapping is extended to terms as follows: ν( f (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = f (ν(t 1 ), . . . , ν(t n )). We will disregard variable assignments for formulas with no free variables (called sentences) since they do not affect ground formulas.
Definition 4 (APC Herbrand Models).
Let I be an APC Herbrand interpretation and ν be a variable assignment. For an atomic formula p(t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ) : s, we write I |= ν p(t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ) : s if and only if p(ν(t 1 ), ν(t 2 ), . . . , ν(t n )) : s ∈ I. For well-formed formulas φ and ψ, we write:
-I |= ν φ ∧ ψ if and only if I |= ν φ and I |= ν ψ; -I |= ν φ ∨ ψ if and only if I |= ν φ or I |= ν ψ; -I |= ν ¬φ if and only if not I |= ν φ ; -I |= ν (∀X)φ if and only if I |= ν ′ φ , for every assignment ν ′ that differs from ν only in its X-value;
-I |= ν (∃X)φ if and only if I |= ν ′ φ , for some ν ′ that differs from ν only in its X-value; -I |= ν ψ ← φ if and only if I |= ν ¬φ ∨ ψ; -I |= ν ∼ p : s if and only if I |= ν p :∼ s, where ∼ t = f, ∼ f = t, ∼ ⊤ = ⊤ and ∼⊥ = ⊥;
We also define:
A formula φ is satisfied by I if and only if I |= ν φ for every valuation ν. In this case we write simply I |= φ . I is a model of a set of formulas P if and only if every formula φ ∈ P is satisfied in I. A set of formulas P logically entails a formula ψ, denoted P |= ψ, if and only if every model of P is also a model of ψ.
APC has two types of logical entailment: ontological and epistemic. Ontological entailment is the entailment |=, which we have just defined. Before defining the epistemic entailment, we motivate it with a number of examples. To avoid clutter, in all examples we will only show the highest annotation for each APC predicate. For instance, if a model contains p : ⊤, then we will not show p : t, p : f, or p :⊥. Example 1. Consider the following set of APC formulas P = {q : t ← p : t, p : t}. It has four models: m 1 = {p : t, q : t}, m 2 = {p : ⊤, q : t}, m 3 = {p : t, q : ⊤} and m 4 = {p : ⊤, q : ⊤}. Thus, P |= q : t holds (since q : t occurs in every model of P).
Example 2.
The APC set of formulas P = {q : t ← p : t, p : ⊤} has two models: m 1 = {p : ⊤, q : t} and m 2 = {p : ⊤, q : ⊤}. Therefore, P |= q : t holds.
Example 3. This set of formulas P = {q : t <∼ p : t, p : t} is similar to that in Example 1 except that it uses epistemic implication instead of the ontological one. One of the models of that set is m = {p : ⊤, q :⊥} and therefore P |= q : t.
Examples 1 and 2 show that ontological implication has the modus ponens property, but it may be too strong, as it allows one to draw conclusions from inconsistent information. Epistemic implication of Example 3, on the other hand, is too cautious and does not have the modus ponens property. However, epistemic implication does have the modus ponens property and it blocks drawing conclusions from inconsistency under the epistemic entailment, defined next. a male. Therefore, given a choice, we would hold it less likely that person(robin) is inconsistent than that male(robin) is. Likewise, in the following example, given a choice, we are more likely to hold to a belief that Pete is a person than to a belief that he is rich.
Example 5. Consider the following formulas
There are three most e-consistent models: In this paper, we capture the above intuition by extending the notion of most e-consistent models with additional preferences over models.
Definition 6 (Consistency-preference relation and consistency-preferred models). A consistency preference S over interpretations, where S is a set of ground ⊤-predicates in APC, is defined as follows:
-An interpretation I 1 is consistency-preferred over I 2 with respect to S, denoted I 1 < S I 2 , if and only if S ∩ I 1 ⊂ S ∩ I 2 . -Interpretation I 1 and I 2 are consistency-equal with respect to S, denoted I 1 = S I 2 , if and only if S ∩ I 1 = S ∩ I 2 .
A consistency-preference relation < S , where S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n ) is a sequence of sets of ground ⊤-predicates, is defined as a lexicographic order composed out of the sequence of consistency preferences S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n . Namely, I 1 < S I 2 if and only iff there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
A model I of a set of formulas P is called (most) consistency-preferred with respect to < S if P has no other model J such that J < S I.
We will always assume that S n = B ⊤ -the set of all ground ⊤-predicates and, therefore, any most consistency-preferred model is also a most e-consistent one.
We use the notation |≈ S to denote epistemic entailment with respect to most consistencypreferred models. A program P epistemically entails a formula ψ with respect to a consistencypreference relation < S , denoted P|≈ S ψ, if and only if every most consistency-preferred model of P is also a model of ψ.
Logic Programming Subset of APC and Its Stable Models Semantics
In this section, we define the logic programming subset of APC, denoted APC LP , and give it a new kind of semantics based on consistency-preferred stable models. Definition 7. An APC LP program consists of rules of the form:
where each l i is an epistemic literal. Variables are assumed to be implicitly universally quantified. An APC LP formula is either a singleton epistemic literal, or a conjunction of epistemic literals, or a disjunction of them.
The formula l 0 ∨ · · · ∨ l m is called the head of the rule, and l m+1 ∧ · · · ∧ l n ∧ ¬ l n+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ l k is the body of that rule.
Recall from Section 2 that epistemic negation can be pushed inside and eliminated via this law: ∼ p : α ≡ p :∼ α, where ∼ t = f, ∼ f = t, ∼ ⊤ = ⊤, and ∼⊥ = ⊥ so, for brevity, we assume that all APC LP programs are transformed in this way and the epistemic negation is eliminated.
When the rule body is empty, the ontological implication symbol ← is usually omitted and the rule becomes a disjunction. Such a disjunction can also be represented as an epistemic implication and sometimes this representation may be closer to a normal English sentence. For instance, the sentence, "If a person is a businessman then that person is rich," can be represented as an epistemic implication: rich(X) : t <∼ person(X) : t ∧ businessman(X) : t, which is easier to read than the equivalent disjunction rich(X) :
The notion of stable models for APC LP carries over from standard answer set programming (ASP) with very few changes. -M is a stable model of P, and -M is a most consistency-preferred model with respect to < S .
Embedding APC LP into ASP
We now show that APC LP can be isomorphically embedded in ASP extended with a model preference framework, such as the Clingo system (Gebser et al. 2011 ) with its Asprin extension (Brewka et al. 2015) . We then prove the correctness of this embedding, i.e., that it is one-to-one and preserves the semantics. Next, we define the subset of ASP onto which APC LP maps.
Definition 11. ASP truth is a subset of ASP programs where the only predicate is truth/2, which is used to reify the APC predicate terms and associate them with truth values. That is, these atoms have the form truth(p, s) , where the first argument is the reification of an APC predicate term and the second argument is one of these truth annotations: t, f, top, or bottom.
An ASP truth program consists a set of rules of the form:
where the t i 's are truth/2-predicates.
An ASP truth formula is either a singleton truth/2-predicate, a conjunction of such predicates, or a disjunction of them.
Definition 12. The embedding of an APC LP program in ASP truth , denoted Ξ asp , is defined recursively as follows (where tv asp is the truth value mapping):
where L is an APC literal and φ is a conjunction of APC literals -Ξ asp (head ← body) = Ξ asp (head) ← Ξ asp (body), where head (resp., body) denotes the head (resp., the body) of a rule.
The embedding Ξ asp also applies to APC Herbrand interpretations: each APC Herbrand interpretation (which is a set of APC atoms of the form p : s) is mapped to a set of ASP truth atoms (of the form truth(p,tv asp (s)) ).
We require that each ASP truth program includes the following background axioms to match the semantics of APC: truth(X,top) :-truth(X,t),truth(X,f). truth(X,t) :-truth(X,top). truth(X,f) :-truth(X,top). truth(X,bottom). Lemma 1. The embedding Ξasp : APC LP → ASP truth is a one-to-one correspondence.
Proof. As mentioned, we can limit our attention to ∼-free programs. First, it is obvious that Ξ asp is injective on APC literals. Injectivity on APC conjunctions and disjunctions can be shown by a straightforward induction on the number of conjuncts and disjuncts. Surjectivity follows similarly because it is straightforward to define the inverse of Ξ asp by reversing the equations of Definition 12.
Next, we show the above APC-to-ASP embedding preserves models, Gelfond-Lifshitz reduct, stable models, and also consistency preference relations. Proof. Recall that every APC truth is required to have the four rules listed right after Definition 12. These rules obviously enforce the requisite closures. The second part of the lemma follows directly from the definitions. 
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of Ξ apc and its inverse. (M) . Thus, the set of models for P M is in a one-one correspondence with the set of models for (M) . By Lemma 5, this correspondence preserves set-inclusion, so the set of minimal models of P M stands in one-one correspondence with respect to Ξ asp with the set of minimal models of
Theorem 6. M is a stable model of an APC LP program P if and only if
Ξ asp (M) is a stable model of Ξ asp (P).
Proof. By Lemma 4, J is a model of
A consistency preference relation < S , where S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n ), is translated into the following Asprin (Brewka et al. 2015 ) lexico preference relation A along with several subset preferences relations, each corresponding to one of the < S i that are part of < S (see Definition 6) .
#preference( A , lexico){ 1::name( s 1 ); 2::name( s 2 ); . . .; n:: Proof. The definition in the Asprin manual of the Asprin lexico and subset preference relations, as applied to our preference statements A given just prior to Lemma 7, is just a paraphrase of the lexicographical consistency-preference relation S in Definition 6. The lemma now follows from the obvious fact that Ξ asp maps ⊤-literals of ASP onto the top-literals of ASP truth , which have the form truth(p, top). 
. Since, by Lemma 7, Ξ asp maps the preference relation S over the APC models into the preference relation A over the ASP models, the result follows.
Jobs Puzzle and Inconsistency
Jobs Puzzle (Wos et al. 1984 ) is a classical logical puzzle that became a benchmark of sorts for many automatic theorem provers (Shapiro 2011; Schwitter 2013) ; it is also included in TPTP. 2 The usual description of Jobs Puzzle does not include implicit knowledge, like the facts that a person is either a male or a female (but not both), the husband of a person must be unique, etc., so we add this knowledge explicitly, like (Schwitter 2013). We also changed the name Steve to Robin in order to better illustrate one form of inconsistency.
1. There are four people: Roberta, Thelma, Robin and Pete. 2. Among them, they hold eight different jobs. 3. Each holds exactly two jobs. 4. The jobs are: chef, guard, nurse, telephone operator, police officer (gender not implied), teacher, actor, and boxer. 5. The job of nurse is held by a male. 6. The husband of the chef is the telephone operator. 7. Roberta is not a boxer. 8. Pete has no education past the ninth grade. 9. Roberta, the chef, and the police officer went golfing together.
In sum there are four people and eight jobs and to solve the puzzle one must figure out who holds which jobs. The solution is that Thelma is a chef and a boxer (and is married to Pete). Pete is a telephone operator and an actor. Roberta is a teacher and a guard. Finally, Robin is a police officer and a nurse.
However, if we inject inconsistency into the puzzle, current logical approaches fail because they are based on logics that do not tolerate inconsistency. Consider the following examples. (as, say, in TPTP) 
Example 6. Let us add to the puzzle that "Thelma is an actor." Given that the original puzzle implies that Thelma is not an actor (she was a chef and a boxer), this addition causes inconsistencies. A first-order encoding of the puzzle

Knowledge Representation Principles for Inconsistency
Mere encoding of Jobs Puzzle in APC LP is not enough because it is not unique: when inconsistency is taken into account, more information needs to be provided to obtain the encodings that match user intent. The main problem is that, if inconsistency is allowed, the number of possible worlds can grow to many hundreds even in relatively simple scenarios like Jobs Puzzle, and this practically annuls the benefits of the switch to a paraconsistent logic. We have already seen small examples of such scenarios at the end of Section 2, which motivated our notion of consistency preference, but there are more. We organize these scenarios around six main principles.
Principle 1: Contrapositive inference
Like in classical logic, contrapositive inference may be useful for knowledge representation. Consider the following sentences:
If someone is a nurse, then that someone is educated. Pete is not educated.
We could encode the first sentence as educated(X) : t ← nurse(X) : t or as educated(X) : t <∼ nurse(X) : t. Classically, the above sentences imply that Pete is not a nurse, but the encoding of the first sentence using the ontological implication ← would not allow for that. If contrapositive inference is required, epistemic implication should be used. Principle 2: Propagation of inconsistency As discussed in Example 2, APC gives us a choice of whether to draw conclusions from inconsistent information or not, and it is a useful choice. One way to block such inferences, illustrated in that example, is to use epistemic implication. Another way is to use the ontological implication with the t + ¬⊤ pattern in the rule body, e.g.,
Both techniques block inferences from inconsistent information, but the second also blocks inference by contraposition, as discussed in Principle 1. The following examples illustrate the use of both of these methods.
Example 10. Let P = {educated(X) : t <∼ nurse(X) : t, nurse(pete) : ⊤}. Observe that there is one most consistency preferred model with respect to < S (as before, S = (B ⊤ )): m = {educated(pete) :⊥, nurse(pete) : ⊤}. Therefore, P| ≈ S educated(pete) : t.
Example 11. Let P = {educated(X) : t ← nurse(X) : t ∧ ¬nurse(X) : ⊤, nurse(pete) : ⊤}. As in the previous example, P has a most consistency preferred model m = {nurse(pete) : ⊤, educated(pete) :⊥} and so P | ≈ S educated(pete) : t.
In both of these examples, inconsistency is not propagated through the rules, but Example 10 allows for contrapositive inference, while Example 11 does not. Indeed, suppose that instead of nurse(pete) : ⊤ we had educated(pete) : f. Then, in the first case, nurse(pete) : f would be derived, while in the second it would not.
Blocking contrapositive inference and non-propagation of inconsistency can be applied selectively to some literals but not the others. 
Example 12. Consider the following sentence, "if a person holds a job of nurse then that person is educated". It can be encoded as
(educated(X) : t <∼ nurse(X) : t) ← person(X) : t.
Principle 3: Polarity
This principle addresses situations such as the sentence "A person must be either a male or a female, but not both". When inconsistency is possible, we want to say three things: that any person must be either a male and or a female, that these facts cannot be unknown, and that if one of these is inconsistent then the other is too.
Example 13. Let P be: Conditional polarity (or polar dependency) is generally represented as follows
Two most consistency preferred models exist, which minimize the inconsistency of person(robin):
where condition is a conjunction of atomic formulas and p, q are polar facts with respect to that condition.
Principle 4: Consistency preference relations
Recall from Example 5 that inconsistent information is not created equal, as people have different degrees of confidence in different pieces of information. For example, we have more confidence that someone whom we barely know is a person compared to the information about this person's marital situation (e.g., whether a husband exists). Therefore, person-facts are more likely to be consistent than marriage-facts and so we need to define consistency preference relations to specify the degrees of confidence. Consistency preference relations were introduced in Definition 6, and we already had numerous examples of its use. In Jobs Puzzle encoding in Appendix A, we use one, fairly elaborate, consistency preference relation. It first sets person and job information to be of the highest degree of confidence. Then, it prefers consistency of gender information of everybody but Robin. Third, it prefers consistency of the job assignment information. And finally, it minimizes inconsistency in general, for all facts.
Principle 5: Complete knowledge
This principle stipulates that certain information is defined completely, and cannot be unknown (⊥). But it can be inconsistent. Moreover, similarly to closed world assumption, negative information is preferred. For instance, if we do not know that someone is someone's husband, we may assume that that person is not. Such conclusions can be specified via a rule like this:
Note that, unlike, say ASP, jumping to negative conclusions is not ensured by the stable model semantics of APC and must be given explicitly. But the advantage is that it can be done selectively. More generally, this type of reasoning can be specified as
if p is known to be a predicate that is defined completely under the condition.
Principle 6: Exactly N
This principle captures the encoding of cardinality constraints in the presence of inconsistency. For instance, in Jobs Puzzle, the sentences "Every person holds exactly two jobs" and "Every job is held by exactly one person" are encoded as cardinality constraints:
These constraints count both true and inconsistent hold-facts, but can be easily modified to count only consistent true facts. Note the role of the last rule, which closes off the information being counted by the constraint. This is necessary because if, say, Pete is concluded to hold exactly two jobs (of an actor and a phone operator) then there should be nothing unknown about him holding any other job. Instead, hold(pete, X) : f ∧ hold(pete, X) : ⊤ should be true for any other job X.
The general form of the exactly N constraint is:
As in ASP, such statements can be represented as a number of ground disjunctive rules. The "exactly N" constraints can be generalized to "at least N and at most M" constraints, if we extend the semantics in the direction of (Soininen et al. 2001 ).
Comparison with Other Work
Although a great deal of work is dedicated to paraconsistent logics and logical formalizations for word puzzles separately, we are unaware of any work that applies paraconsistent logics to solving word puzzles that might contain inconsistencies. As we demonstrated, mere encoding of such puzzles in a paraconsistent logic leads to an explosion of possible worlds, which is not helpful. 4 Most paraconsistent logics (Priest et al. 2015; J. Y. Beziau 2007; Belnap Jr 1977; da Costa 1974) deal with inconsistency from the philosophical or mathematical point of view and do not discuss knowledge representation. Other paraconsistent logics (Blair and Subrahmanian 1989; Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992) were developed for definite logic programs and cannot be easily applied to solving more complex knowledge representation problems that arise in word puzzles. An interesting question is whether our use of APC is essential, i.e., whether the notions of consistency-preferred models can be adapted to other paraconsistent logics and the relationship with ASP can be established. First, it is clear that such an adaptation is unlikely for proof-theoretic approaches to inconsistency, such as (da Costa 1974). We do not know if such an adaptation is possible for model-theoretic approaches, such as (Belnap Jr 1977) .
On the word puzzles front, (Wos et al. 1984 ) used the first-order logic theorem prover OT-TER to solve Jobs Puzzle 5 and (Shapiro 2011) represented Jobs Puzzle in multiple logical languages: TPTP, 6 Constraint Lingo ) layered on top of the ASP system Smodels (Syrjänen and Niemelä 2001) as the backend, and the SNePS commonsense reasoning system (Shapiro 2000). More recently, (Baral and Dzifcak 2012; Schwitter 2013) represented word puzzles using NL/CNL sentences, and then automatically translate them into ASP. None of these underlying formalisms, FOL, ASP, and SNePS, are equipped to reason in the presence of inconsistency. In contrast, APC LP , combined with the knowledge representation principles developed in Section 6, localizes inconsistency and computes useful possible worlds. In addition, APC LP has mechanisms to control how inconsistency is propagated through inference, it allows one to prioritize inconsistent information, and it provides several other ways to express user's intent (through contraposition, completion of knowledge, etc.).
Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the problem of knowledge representation in the presence of inconsistent information with particular focus on representing English sentences using logic, as in word puzzles (Wos et al. 1984; Shapiro 2011; Ponnuru et al. 2004; Schwitter 2013; Baral and Dzifcak 2012) . We have shown that a number of considerations play a role in deciding on a particular encoding, which includes whether or not inconsistency should be propagated through implications, relative degrees of confidence in different pieces of information, and others. We used the well-known Jobs, Zebra and Marathon puzzles (see the appendices in the supplemental material) to illustrate many of the above issues and show how the conclusions change with the introduction of different kinds of inconsistency into the puzzle.
As a technical tool, we started with a paraconsistent logic called Annotated Predicate Calculus (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992) and then gave it a special kind of non-monotonic semantics that is based on consistency-preferred stable models. We also showed that these models can be computed using ASP systems that support preference relations over stable models, such as Clingo (Gebser et al. 2011 ) with the Asprin extension (Brewka et al. 2015) .
For future work, we will consider additional puzzles which may suggest new knowledge representation principles. In addition, we will investigate ways to incorporate inconsistency into CNL systems. This will require introduction of background knowledge into these systems and linguistic cues into the grammar. 
Appendix A Jobs Puzzle in APC LP with Inconsistency Injections
We now present a complete APC LP encoding of Jobs Puzzle and highlight the principles, introduced in Section 6, used in the encoding. We also show several cases of inconsistency injection and discuss the consequences. The English sentences are based on the CNL representation of Jobs Puzzle from Section 3 in (Schwitter 2013) where "Steve" is changed to "Robin" for the sake of an example (because Robin can be both a male and a female name). Sentence 4 is encoded based on Principle 3, which treats male and female as polar facts.
Exclude that a person is male and that the person is female. male(X) : t ∨ female(X) : t ← person(X) : t. male(X) : f ∨ female(X) : f ← person(X) : t. female(X) : ⊤ ← person(X) : t ∧ male(X) : ⊤. male(X) : ⊤ ← person(X) : t ∧ female(X) : ⊤.
We encode sentences 5 and 6 using Principle 6, which constrains the cardinality of hold(X, Y ). This will cause second rule in Sentence 5 to be repeated as part of encoding of Sentence 6, so we omit the duplicate.
5 If there is a job then exactly one person holds that job. Sentences 8-13 are encoded based on Principles 1 and 2, where contrapositive inference and propagation of inconsistency are allowed for some literals but not others. Notice that it is undesirable to allow propagation of inconsistency from person-facts and job-facts, since it is unreasonable to conclude that somebody is, say, a male while being unsure that this somebody is a person. Ditto about the jobs. Contrapositive reasoning (say, from non-male to non-person) is also inappropriate here because we have higher confidence in someone being a person. So, we use ontological implication ← in the next group of rules. (
Exclude that Roberta holds a job as boxer.
hold (roberta, boxer) :
Encoding of the following fact is straightforward.
14 Exclude that Pete is educated. hold(roberta, police) : f ← job(police) : t ∧ ¬ job(police) : ⊤. 20 Exclude that a person holds a job as a chef and that the same person holds a job as a police officer.
Next we define the consistency preference relation < S , where S = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , B ⊤ ), which implements Principle 4. Here s 1 says that we hold greater confidence in the information about someone being a person and something being a job than in any other kind of information in the puzzle. That is, these facts are least likely to be inconsistent. Next, s 2 says that we are very likely to believe that Pete is a male name and Thelma and Roberta are female names. We are not sure about Robin, so s/he is left out in s 2 . The set s 3 says that next we are likely to believe the information on who holds which jobs. The last component in S , B ⊤ , is the usual default that prefers the most e-consistent models. Sentences 3 and 4 imply inconsistency regarding Robin's gender. The first model is the same as in the original puzzle (as far as the job assignments go). In the second model, since Robin's gender is inconsistent (both male and female), it is compatible to make Robin a chef and Thelma a police officer. Therefore, we derive that Pete is Robin's husband instead of Thelma's.
The next variation of the original puzzle explicitly assumes that Robin is Thelma's husband.
Robin is a husband of Thelma -Variation 3 husband(robin,thelma) : t.
Here we need to add more background knowledge about marital relations. For instance, that every person can marry or be married to at most one person. Together with Sentence 23, this will cause inconsistency because the original puzzle implies that Pete is Thelma's husband. In (Schwitter 2013), this implicit knowledge is not stated, so it will fail to detect inconsistency. If such background knowledge were added to Schwitter's formulation as constraints then there would be no models. The background knowledge we need is:
24 A person who is a male is a husband of exactly one other person, or that person is null. 25 A person who is a female has exactly one husband or that husband is null. 26 Exclude that person X is a husband of Y and person Z is a husband of X simultaneously. 27 If it is not derivable that person X is person Y's husband, then X is not Y's husband.
Sentences 24 -26 are cardinality constraints and are encoded based on Principle 6. Sentence 27 says that the information about husbands is complete; it is encoded based on Principle 5. Also, we block propagation of inconsistency from male and female based on Principle 2.
There are six models. When these models are projected on hold/2 (which constitutes the solution to the puzzle) and the ⊤-predicates, we get three distinct sets: The puzzle originally implied that Pete is Thelma's husband. Since we now explicitly stated that Robin is Thelma's husband, Sentences 25 and 27 will force husband(pete,thelma) : f to hold. By Sentence 10, hold(pete, operator) : t and hold(T helma, chef) : t cannot hold simultaneously, so many solutions with inconsistencies in them will be generated. Due to the consistency preference relations, the APC LP encoding will prefer the models where educated(pete) : ⊤ holds.
Sentences 24 and 25 sanction two possibilities for the husband information in each of the above models. For instance, the model m 1 corresponds to two models out of the six models that we get; they differ only in their husband information. Given that Pete is not an operator and Roberta is not a chef, Pete is not necessarily Roberta's husband. Therefore, there are two cases: one where husband(pete, roberta) : t holds and the other where husband(pete, null) : t and husband(null, roberta) : t hold. Similar considerations apply to m 2 and m 3 .
The next variation applies the background knowledge about husbands from Variation 3 to Variations 1 and 2. There are now two models, and their projections on hold-and ⊤-predicates are compatible with the solution to Variation 1. The only difference between these two models is in husbandpredicates, so we show only that part. There are three models and their projections on hold-and ⊤-predicates are compatible with Variation 2. The only difference with Variation 2 is in the husband-predicates, which we show: Sentences 7-16 describe the implicit knowledge about the one-to-one correspondence between houses, colors, persons, drinks, cigarettes, and pets. They are encoded as the cardinality constraints on the predicates house_color (H,C), house_nationality(H, N), house_drink(H, D), house_smoke(H,C), and house_pet(H, P) . We encode Sentences 7 -8 using Principles 5 and 6. This will cause the second rule in Sentence 8 to be repeated as part of the encoding of Sentence 7, so we omit the duplicate. The rest of the sentences follow the same idea.
7 Each house has exactly one color.
1{house_color(H,C) : Sentences 17-20 correspond to Sentences (b)-(e) in the original puzzle. The encoding is based on Principles 1 and 2, where contrapositive inference and propagation of inconsistency are allowed for some literals but not others. Notice that it is undesirable to allow propagation of inconsistency from house-facts, since it is unreasonable to conclude that somebody lives in a house while being unsure that something is a house. Contrapositive reasoning is also inappropriate here. For instance, if there is uncertainty about the color of a house, it is unreasonable to conclude that something is not a house because one is much more likely to discern a house than its color. So, in the next group of rules, we separate house(H) from color and other facts using use ontological implication ←.
17 If the Englishman lives in a house then the color of the house is red.
( 
Sentences 23-25 correspond to Sentence (f). The encoding of Sentences 23-24 is straightforward. The encoding of Sentence 25 is based on Principles 1 and 2.
23 The color of the first house is not green.
house_color (1, green) : f. 24 The color of the fifth house is not ivory.
house_color (5, ivory) 
Sentences 32-34 correspond to Sentence (k). Sentences 32-33 are encoded based on Principle 1. Sentence 34 is encoded based on Principles 1 and 2.
32 If Chesterfield is smoked in the first house then fox is kept in the second house.
house_pet (2, There is a single most consistency preferred model:
tuple (1, yellow, norwegian, water, kools, fox) : t tuple (2, blue, ukrainian, tea, chesterfield, horse) : t tuple (3, red, englishman, milk, old_gold, snails) : t tuple (4, ivory, spaniard, orange_ juice, lucky_strike, dog) : t tuple (5, green, japanese, coffee, parliament, zebra) : t Not surprisingly, this solution matches the usual correct solution because so far we have not injected any inconsistency and so, for example, the preferences s 1 and s 2 play no role.
Next, we illustrate three cases of injection of inconsistency into the puzzle. Since complete models tend to be rather large, we show only tuple/6 and ⊤-predicates.
43 The Ukrainian lives in the middle house -Variation 1 house_nationality (3, ukrainian) : t.
There are two models: yellow, norwegian, water, kools, zebra) : t tuple (2, blue, japanese, tea, parliament, horse) : t tuple (3, ivory, ukrainian, milk, old_gold, snails) : t tuple (4, green, spaniard, coffee, chesterfield, dog) : t tuple (5, red, englishman, orange_ juice, lucky_strike, fox) : t house_nationality (3, ukrainian) : ⊤} m 2 = {tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, tea, kools, zebra) : t tuple (2, blue, japanese, water, parliament, horse) : t tuple (3, ivory, ukrainian, milk, old_gold, snails) : t tuple (4, green, spaniard, coffee, chesterfield, dog) : t tuple (5, red, englishman, orange_ juice, lucky_strike, fox) : t house_nationality (3, ukrainian) : ⊤}
The puzzle originally implied that the Ukrainian lives in the second house. Therefore, Variation 1 generates an inconsistency about the Ukrainian being in the middle house. By Sentence 20, we cannot derive house_drink (3,tea) : t because propagation of inconsistency is blocked in this case. This sanctions two possibilities: one where house_drink(1, water) : t and house_drink (2,tea) : t hold and the other where house_drink(1,tea) : t and house_drink (2, water) : t hold.
44 The Lucky Strike is smoked in the middle house -Variation 2 house_smoke (3, lucky_strike) : t.
Again, we have two models: yellow, norwegian, water, kools, fox) : t tuple (2, blue, ukrainian, tea, chesterfield, horse) : t tuple (3, ivory, spaniard, milk, lucky_strike, dog) : t tuple (4, green, japanese, coffee, parliament, zebra) : t tuple (5, red, englishman, orange_ juice, old_gold, snails) : t house_smoke (3, lucky_strike) : ⊤} m 2 = {tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, orange_ juice, kools, fox) : t tuple (2, blue, ukrainian, tea, chesterfield, horse) : t tuple (3, ivory, spaniard, milk, lucky_strike, dog) : t tuple (4, green, japanese, coffee, parliament, zebra) : t tuple (5, red, englishman, water, old_gold, snails) : t house_smoke (3, lucky_strike) : ⊤}
The puzzle originally implied that the Lucky Strike is smoked in the fourth house. As a result, Variation 2 generates an inconsistency regarding the Lucky Strike being smoked in the middle house. By Sentence 38, we cannot derive house_drink (3, orange_ (3, milk) : ⊤. This is because the puzzle originally implied that milk is drunk in the middle house.
Appendix C Marathon Puzzle in APC LP with Inconsistency Injections
We present here a complete APC LP encoding of Marathon Puzzle (C. Guéret and Sevaux 2000; Schwitter 2012) . As with the previous puzzles, the encoding highlights the principles of Section 6 and we also discuss several cases of inconsistency injection. Marathon puzzle is as follows: Dominique, Ignace, Naren, Olivier, Philippe, and Pascal have arrived as the first six at the Paris marathon. Olivier has not arrived last. Dominique, Pascal and Ignace have arrived before Naren and Olivier. Dominique who was third last year has improved this year. Philippe is among the first four. Ignace has arrived neither in second nor third position. Pascal has beaten Naren by three positions. Neither Ignace nor Dominique are in the fourth position.
The original description implies some implicit background knowledge. First, no runners arrive at the same time (i.e., each runner has a unique arrival position and vice versa). Second, a runner arrives before another runner if the first runner's position number is smaller than the second runner's position.
There is a unique solution for Marathon Puzzle where Ignace arrives first, followed by Dominique, Pascal, Philippe, Olivier, and Naren, in that order. Next, we show the encoding of Marathon puzzle. Next we define the consistency preference relation < S , where S = (s 1 , s 2 , B ⊤ ), which implements Principle 4. Here s 1 says that we hold greater confidence in the information about the runner-and position-facts and therefore these types of facts are less likely to be inconsistent. The preference s 2 says that next we are likely to be confident in the information given by the has_position-and before-facts. The last component in S , B ⊤ , is the usual default that gives preference to the most e-consistent models. There is a single most consistency-preferred model as expected. The puzzle, as stated, has no inconsistent information so we show only the has_position-facts. m = {has_position(ignace, 1) : t, has_position(dominique, 2) : t, has_position(pascal, 3) : t, has_position(philippe, 4) : t, has_position(olivier, 5) : t, has_position(naren, 6) : t}. In addition, there are many before-facts which encode the sequential order of arrival of the runners.
Next, we illustrate several cases of injection of inconsistency into the puzzle. Since complete models tend to be rather large, we show only the has_position-and ⊤-predicates. ⊤}. The first model generates the same solution as the original puzzle except for the inconsistency where Philippe arrives before Dominique. The second model places Ignace in the fourth position, which contradicts Sentence 11, so placing Ignace in the fourth position becomes inconsistent. The third model places Olivier before Ignace, which is in contradiction with Sentence 6. All the other constraints are satisfied, so no more inconsistencies are derived. The fourth model places Naren before Pascal and Ignace, which contradicts Sentence 6. Besides, it places Olivier the last, which contradicts Sentence 4.
